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Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between individual creative productivity and learning about 
ideas of others. I report evidence from a two-stage real-effort lab experiment, in which subjects perform idea-
generation tasks. In the first stage some subjects observe creative output of other players, while the others 
not. This design makes possible to assess whether learning ideas of others is an important input for idea 
generation and quantify its importance. In the second stage, I make ideas costly and study the subjects’ 
willingness to pay for them. I compare the costs of ideas to the expected monetary benefits from increased 
creative productivity and characterize investment behavior of the subjects. The results show that observing 
output of others boosts productivity in creative tasks, but only when it shows truly new, previously unknown 
by the subject items. When ideas of others become costly, I find that the subjects do not act in a profit-
maximizing way. To minimize the costs they choose to see the ideas of less creative players, which usually do 
not contribute many original items. As a result, the participants get less than optimum benefits. This effect is 
more pronounced for subjects of lower creative ability, more risk-averse or self-confident participants and 
females. In aggregate, such behavior does not lead to the highest possible level of creative production. These 
findings make an argument for policies that encourage exchange of information at a workplace (e.g. 
teamwork, workshops) and at the same time show the need for oversight, central planning of collaborative 
activities or other actions that may help to creative professionals to invest efficiently, when access to ideas of 
others is costly. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The understanding that more interactions between professionals lead to higher productivity has been widely 
supported by organizations1. The belief that being in touch with more people is beneficial for job performance 
is shaping a new corporate trend. Diverse tools for professional communication emerge and flourish (e.g., 
webinars, ideas.repec.org, LinkedIn). Firms actively use secondments, regular staff catch-ups, open plan office 
design and common spaces to foster interaction and exchange of ideas2. Modern network literature also lists 
exchange of ideas among the plausible explanations of higher creative productivity (Ductor et al., 2014). 
Network analysis of creative professionals in different fields suggest that more productive individuals are at 
the same time more connected and central in their networks, for instance in academia (Goyal et al., 2006) or 
management (Burt, 2004 and Cross et al., 2008). However, this evidence is derived from exogenously formed 
networks and does not imply that connections cause productivity (Manski, 1993; Moffit, 2001). It also could 
be the case that more productive individuals are also more proactive in reaching other people. Understanding 
as to whether access to new ideas leads to higher creative productivity is insightful. An answer to this 
question may serve as an argument for or against teamwork, increasing the level of interactions at the 
workplace or making privileged information available to a wider public3. Furthermore, as in many cases 
                                                                    
1 “A key purpose of the workplace is for sharing ideas including enhancing your product and service offerings, 
this won’t happen by shutting people away," states Matt Oakley, Chairman of the Research Committee of the 
British Council for Offices. 
2 In addition to exchange of ideas, workplace interactions have many other attributes, which are not 
considered here. Examples include an opportunity to get helpful feedback, find potential collaborators or 
simply the motivational impact. 
3 The US Patent and Trademark Office publishes every patent application "promptly after the expiration of a 
period of eighteen months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under title 35, United 
States Code" (USPTO, Patent Laws, Regulations, Policies & Procedures). 
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interactions imply costs in terms of money or time, examining whether people over- or underspend in this 
context can advocate or criticize different forms of policies intended to encourage exchange of ideas.  
 
This paper addresses these questions with the help of tools from Production Theory and Experimental 
Economics for the purpose of this study I narrow the definition of interaction to one of its main attributes - 
observing new ideas - and explore how it is embodied in the creative-process technology. I view idea 
generation as a production process and ideas of others as an input or production factor. The objective of this 
paper is to explore the relationship between creative productivity and learning about ideas of others by using 
the evidence from a two-phase real effort laboratory experiment. First, I study whether observing ideas of 
others lead to an increase in creative productivity and quantify this effect. Second, I analyze individuals’ 
willingness to pay for ideas when access to them is costly. I check if individuals make economically efficient 
investment decisions in ideas of others and study whether these decisions depend on creative ability of 
individuals or their behavioral characteristics as for example attitudes towards risk. In order to answer these 
questions, I analyze the data from a lab experiment, in which subjects perform the Torrance’s idea generation 
task (Torrance, 1974). In different treatments I vary (i) whether or not players are shown output of other 
subjects, and (ii) whether participants are shown the output of a randomly assigned peer or are given an 
opportunity to acquire the output of a peer they choose. I measure creative output as a number of 
conceptually distinct ideas generated and intensity of the treatment as a number of new ideas observed. By 
comparing the creative output of players who were shown ideas of others (Treatment group) to those who 
were not (Control group), I quantify the effect that ideas of others have on creative productivity.  
 
I find that observing new ideas leads to a substantial productivity increase, as our Treatment group produced, 
on average, 20% more original ideas than our Control group. However, creative productivity only responds to 
new, original ideas of others. Output of low creative-ability players, often trivial and not original, is not 
beneficial for creative productivity. This finding is consistent with multiple creative stimuli mechanism, 
where a new idea is born as a combination of several existing ones (Nijstad and Stroebe, 2006). If a subject 
does not observe a new concept, no new combination is produced. In the treatments where ideas are costly 
the subjects can choose whose creative output to observe. All players are characterized by (i) the number of 
ideas they have and (ii) the cost that another subject would need to pay in order to see these ideas. The latter 
cost is set to be an increasing function of a player’s output. In the experiment the participants are free to 
acquire ideas of none, one or more subjects from this menu. I interpret a decision to acquire ideas as an 
investment decision. Each investment has a fixed cost and an uncertain benefit from new ideas in terms of an 
increase in creative productivity. I explore the role of own creative ability, behavioral and demographic 
characteristics for investment behavior. I find that subjects do not act in a profit-maximizing way. They 
systematically overestimate potential benefits from ideas of low creative ability players. This effect is more 
pronounced for females, subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion or self-confidence and those of lower 
creative ability. This evidence warns that endogenously formed interaction patterns do not ensure high 
returns.  
 
The most creative players are rarely reached and potential benefits from these interactions are not released. 
Policies that alleviate the costs or externalize choices would be beneficial and desirable for the society. Our 
first contribution is to consider non-monetary instruments of fostering creativity, ideas of others. The 
experimental literature on creativity is mainly dedicated to exploring the effectiveness of different forms of 
monetary incentives to stimulate creative performance (e.g. Eisenberg and Rhoades, 2001; Kachelmeier et al., 
2008; Charness and Grieco, 2019; Bradler et al., 2019), and this study broadens the set of available tools. Our 
second contribution is to provide a numerical assessment of the increase in creative productivity caused by 
observation of ideas of others. This contributes to sociological work on group brainstorming (Paulus and 
Yang, 2000; Dugosh et al., 2000; Nijstad et al., 2002). Our third contribution is to estimate the relationships 
between creative productivity and willingness to acquire ideas of others. To the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is one of the first attempts to consider the technology of creative process from the point of view of 
production theory and to evaluate the efficiency of investment decisions in a real-effort creative task. The 
reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the views on creativity and its 
measurement, mainly from the fields of Psychology and Sociology, and comments on the existent studies 
related to creativity, in particular in Economics. Section 3 describes the experimental design. The estimation 
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strategy is described in Section 4, followed by Section 5 reporting on results. Finally, Section 6 concludes by 
listing possible applications of our findings and outlines guidelines for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Definition and Measurement of Creativity: While it is widely accepted that creative process constitutes a 
basis for innovation, there is still no universal way of defining what creativity is. Meusburger (2009) reckons 
that over a hundred different analyses can be found in the literature. Some authors argue creativity is a mind 
skill, while others consider it a process equipping us to make a new idea. The most common way of defining 
creativity is the production (or development) of ideas, solutions or products that possess two essential 
characteristics: novelty (or originality) and appropriateness (or usefulness for a given context) (Stein, 1974; 
Woodman et al., 1993; Amabile, 1996; Shalley and Perry-Smith, 2001; Mumford, 2003; Byron and Khazanchi, 
2012). This definition of creativity is broad enough to accommodate different types or dimensions of 
creativity phenomena. The majority of creativity classifications can be represented on the convergent-
divergent thinking spectrum (Sternberg, 2006; Galenson, 2004; Runco, 2006, 2007). Convergent thinking is 
essentially the skill or ability to come up with a solution to a well-defined problem, with the unique correct 
answer, while divergent thinking represents the ability to find versatile solutions to problems with many 
correct answers. In this way, different types of creativity require specific approaches to measure it, although 
the majority of proposals provide a combined measure of convergent and divergent thinking (Nielsen et al., 
2008). The most common ways of creativity measurement appropriate for being used in the laboratory rely 
on some type of a creative task4.  
 
The tasks are usually tailored to a specific type of creativity that the researchers intend to measure, as they 
are thought to call for different types of creativity (Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2011). In order to 
measure convergent thinking, closed tasks are used, which call for rational response and contributory 
creativity. Examples of closed tasks include solving a puzzle (Rutstrom and Williams, 2000; Ariely et al., 
2009), finding a way to apply mathematical operations to achieve a given result (Charness and Grieco, 2019).  
For divergent thinking measurement, open tasks are usually used by the researchers, which call for proactive 
creativity. Examples of open tasks include thinking of the title for a story (Eisenberg and Rhoades, 2001), 
developing rebus-puzzles (Kachelmeier et al., 2008), composing a story (Charness and Grieco, 2019), multiple 
uses task (Bradler et al., 2019). Another important aspect of assessing creativity is the grading procedure 
after the task is completed. Here, as well, the grading system usually depends on the task and vary a lot across 
studies. Examples of grading systems include: time to complete the task, whether the task was completed in a 
given time, subjective grade assigned by an “expert” or by a peer, numerical measures, such as a number of 
different ideas generated, or a combination of several methods. Traditional creativity measures widely used 
in social psychology lean toward divergent thinking standardized measurement, and rely on Guilford’s 
intelligence tests (1950; 1967) or Torrance test of creative thinking (1974). 
 
Existing Literature on Creativity: Economic literature on creativity is mostly interested in ascertaining 
what drives creativity by understanding which environments help to maximize creative output. The main 
stream of academic studies is dedicated to the role of monetary incentives on creative performance. Some 
studies have found that incentives may be counter-productive for creative performance (Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2000; Ariely et al., 2009; Amabile, 1996; Kohn, 1993; Hennessey and Amabile, 1998). At the same 
time, there are studies that report the opposite, at least for some specific creative tasks. Eisenberg and 
Rhoades (2001) report rewards leading to higher creative task performance, Nickerson (1999), Collins and 
Amabile (1999) arrive to similar results. Charness and Grieco (2019) observe better creative output under 
performance-contingent scheme in comparison to flat incentives in closed creativity tasks but not in open 
tasks. Also, there are several studies that explore how additional attributes of incentive schemes affect 
creative output, such as competition and quality or quantity incentives. From point of view of competition, it 
was shown that creative output improves under more competitive, but not extremely competitive, reward 
schemes (Bradler et al., 2019; Gross, 2018). As for quantity versus quality considerations, these two 
                                                                    
4 Social psychology also uses carefully designed personality tests, which allow to identify personality treats 
related to creativity or self-reported description of own personality. 
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attributes of creative output are shown to be positively correlated (Stroebe and Diehl, 1994), and the 
incentive schemes that reward quantity but not quality leads to the best results in terms of quantity and 
quality of the creative output, compared to incentivizing just quality or both (Kachelmeier et al., 2008). 
Another stream of literature is dedicated to individual and group performance in creative tasks.  
 
The evidence on group versus individual performance is mixed. In some settings groups show better creative 
output (Stroebe and Diehl, 1994; Paulus and Yang, 2000; Dugosh et al., 2000; Nijstad et al., 2002). The 
mechanism of this effect is that "ideas of others help to retrieve categories of ideas they will increase the 
diversity of idea production" (Nijstad and Stroebe, 2006). This explanation is consistent with so-called “On 
one hand, on another hand” effect discussed by social psychologists: when two ideas are combined, a new 
idea is born. In some other settings, however, individual creative output was superior compared to groups 
(Treffinger et al., 2006). Free-riding and coordination difficulties in groups are listed as plausible causes of 
the latter finding. In this way, settings that make it easy to combine the creativity of several individuals but at 
the same time eliminate inefficiencies of the groups should lead to better creativity outcomes. As for 
creativity in risky environments, recent research shows that underperforming individuals are willing to take 
more risk (Gross, 2018), consistent with theoretical predictions on actions associated with higher-variance 
outcomes. Individuals that are falling behind in a competition are willing to take more risks, as that may 
increase probability of catching up (Cabral, 2003; Anderson and Cabral, 2007). 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
Experimental Tasks: Departing from an understanding of the creative process as generating new and 
appropriate ideas, this paper considers creative productivity from the point of view of Production Theory. By 
combining definitions of productivity (output per unit of input) and creativity (production of new output), 
creative productivity here is defined as a variety of new outputs produced with homogeneous inputs. Defined 
this way, creative productivity falls into category of divergent thinking. This implies that the task used for its 
measurement should involve creation of new output with many possible right answers, that is, an open task. 
With this in mind, this paper relies on idea-generation tasks, which can measure creative output numerically, 
as the number of conceptually different ideas generated by an individual. The tasks used in this experiment 
are borrowed from the Torrance’s Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974). The Torrance’s Test of 
Creative Thinking (TTCT) is a widely used in Psychology, designed to test divergent thinking, as well as 
broader creativity and problem-solving skills. The validity of this test has been confirmed in a large number 
of studies (Kim, 2006). This experiment is based on two tasks from TTCT: the graphic task and the unusual 
uses or verbal task. In the graphic task, participants are given a geometric form, such as a circle or a cross, and 
asked to sketch as many objects as possible, incorporating this form. In the unusual uses task, the participants 
are asked to come up with as many as possible unusual uses for an object, such as pillow or brick.  
 
Both tasks are easy to implement in the laboratory, as they are not time consuming and do not require 
particular skills or background. Also, both tasks capture a central element of applied business innovations: 
the fact that most successful innovations present a clever application of an existing idea or process in a new 
context (Bradler et al., 2019). Originally, performance in TTCT tasks is scored on four scales: (i) fluency, or 
total number of items produced, (ii) flexibility, or the number of different categories of relevant responses, 
(iii) originality, or statistical rarity of the responses and (iv), elaboration or the amount of detail. For this 
experiment, the scoring procedure was modified to depend only on the number of valid (e.g. original) 
answers and does not account for quality or objective originality of ideas once they pass the minimum 
requirement of being distinct from each other. There are two main reasons for this modification. First, this 
straightforward numerical measure avoids relying on opinion of “experts” about quality of creative output. 
Second, it simplifies and speeds up experiment in the lab, as the quantity incentives and scoring procedure 
are easy to explain to the participants and are easy to implement in real afford tasks, as output measurement 
takes less time, reducing the waiting time between the end of experiment and payment to participants. 
Motivated by the fact that quality of ideas goes hand-to-hand with quantity (Christensen et al., 1957; Stroebe 
and Diehl, 1994; Kachelmeier et al., 2008), I believe that in a properly incentivized idea-generation task, the 
number of distinct ideas provides a reliable measurement of an individual’s overall creativity. 
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Graphic Task: In Graphic Task treatments the participants are given a sheet of paper that contains the same 
repetitive workpiece (a geometric form). Treatment sessions consisted of two phases: Phase 1 (Creative 
Production) followed by Phase 2 (Investment). Phase 1 was designed to test experimentally whether 
observing creative output of others helps an individual to come up with more ideas. Phase 2 was aimed at 
analyzing investment behavior when ideas are costly. The task is to sketch as many conceptually different 
objects as possible, which would incorporate given geometric elements. 
 
Figure 1: Examples of Creative Exercise: Graphic Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows several valid examples of creative output corresponding to the different geometrical forms 
used in the experiment: circles, crosses and Ts. For example, two circles can be used to sketch two flowers, a 
car or a tire. For measurement purposes, creative output here is defined as the total number of distinct 
drawings produced within a prescribed time. 
 
Verbal Task: In Verbal Task treatments the participants are shown a picture of a commonly known object 
and asked to list as many conceptually different alternative uses for that item as they can. Similarly to graphic 
task, creative output here is measured as a total number of the different alternative uses for the object 
suggested. The common use, if listed, was not included in the creative output measure. 
 
Table 1: Examples of Creative Exercise: Verbal Task 
Pillow Brick Pen Newspaper 
    
- a Teddy-bear - hold the door - hair-pin - fly-swat 
- to fake pregnancy - fake gold ingot - Martini straw - PC mouse carpet 
 
Table 1 contains several valid alternative uses for the objects used in the experiment: pillow, brick, pen and 
newspaper. 
 
General Procedures: The experiment was conducted in 15 sessions at the LaTeX laboratory at the University 
of Alicante. Each session was based on one of the tasks (Graphic or Verbal), with each subject participating 
only in one session. The sample is based on 181 participants: 52 subjects participated in the Graphic Task5 
sessions and 129 in Verbal Task6 sessions. The subjects were randomly selected from the laboratory’s pool of 
undergraduate students willing to participate in the experiments and then randomly assigned to the 
Treatment and Control sessions corresponding to each task. In the Treatment sessions, the size of final 
payment was determined at the end of the experiment by the results of a randomly selected phase. In the 
Control sessions, participants performed only the first, the Creative Production phase, and were paid 
                                                                    
5 There were 30 participants in the Treatment group (3 sessions) and 22 participants in the Control group (2 
sessions). 
6 There were 60 participants in the Treatment group (4 sessions) and 69 participants in the Control group (6 
sessions). 
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accordingly. The average payment received in the experiment was 9.5 EUR per hour7. At the beginning of each 
session, a printed copy of the instructions was handed out to every participant and read aloud8. Upon 
completing the experimental tasks all participants were asked to complete a brief questionnaire on their 
basic socio-economic and demographic background. Table 2 summarizes the general structure of the 
experiment. 
 
Table 2: Timeline of the Experiment 
Time Treatment Group  Control Group 
 Graphic Task Verbal Task  Graphic/ Verbal Task 
stage 1: 00:00-06:00 TTCT TTCT  TTCT 
 Access to ideas of others:  
 two relevant ideas other player’s output   
stage 2: 06:00-10:00 TTCT TTCT  TTCT 
 
In each phase the participants had exactly 10 minutes to perform one of the creative tasks. Each phase 
consisted of two stages: stage 1 lasted 6 minutes followed by stage 2, which lasted 4 minutes. Stage 1 
procedures and conditions were identical across all Treatment and Control sessions: participants had to 
generate as many different ideas as possible in the framework of the creative task. In stage 2 subjects in the 
Treatment sessions had access to the ideas of others, while subjects in the Control sessions did not9. The 
design is absolutely identical for the Treatment and Control session in all respects except for the fact that 
subjects in Treatment group are shown ideas of others, while subjects in the Control group are not. Thus, any 
difference in creative output between Control and Treatment groups can only be explained by exposure to the 
ideas of others. Despite the similar general structure, Graphic and Verbal Tasks bear significant differences 
with respect to originality of ideas of others.  
 
The ideas shown to the participants in Graphic Task came from an exogenously formed pool of ideas 
controlled by the experimenter. Graphic Task ensures that each participant observe new ideas in Stage 2. In 
Verbal Task sessions ideas come from another subject in the lab, e.g. from an endogenously formed pool of 
ideas. In this case some of these ideas may have coincided with the ones that the recipient has already 
thought of. Graphic Task design allows studying the pure effect of getting access to new ideas. Verbal Task 
design makes the number of new ideas available to each subject uncertain. It depends on both, the sender’s 
and recipient’s creative abilities, as a more creative sender come up with more original ideas, but at the same 
time more creative recipients are less likely to receive an item they have not thought of. This setting 
introduces uncertainty to the payoffs and allows analyzing investment decisions more deeply. Sections 3.2 
and 3.3 describe the experimental procedures corresponding to each task in detail. 
 
Graphic Task 
 
Creative Production (Phase I): After the instructions have been read, the subjects received a sheet of paper 
with a repetitive geometric form similar to the one depicted in Figure 1. Participants were given 10 minutes 
to sketch as many different objects incorporating this form as possible.  All Graphic Task sessions were paper 
and pencil. The phase was split into two stages: Stage 1 (first 6 minutes) followed by Stage 2 (last 4 minutes). 
To distinguish between output produced during the two stages, subjects were asked to change the color of 
the pen they used while sketching. Control group participants were not given any additional instruction 
between stages. Treatment group participants were interrupted twice after the end of the first stage: each 
                                                                    
7 The average payment was 13.6 EUR per participant in Treatment sessions and 6.7 EUR per participant in 
Control sessions. 
8 Full instructions for the experiment can be found in the Appendix. 
9 This duration was calibrated to exaust the pool of ideas of participant of above-average creative ability. Six 
minutes were enough to state all the ideas that the subjects had in almost all the cases, as only two 
participants reported that they still had not mentioned ideas when the second stage started. 
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subject received two envelopes with one relevant drawing each. The first envelope was handed out at the 
beginning of the 7th minute of the task and the second envelope at the beginning of the 9th minute. The 
drawings shown to participants were based on the same geometric form that participants had in their task. 
All examples were taken from the ‘bank of ideas’ formed as a set of the most uncommon drawings produced 
in a non-paid preliminary stage by a team of 9 graduate students. To make sure two new drawings were 
shown, an additional envelope was handed out in case a subject had already sketched a similar object. 
Subjects were encouraged to develop their own ideas and not to copy examples. Only distinct (from each 
other and from examples provided) drawings were counted for payment. Control group participants were 
paid 0.25 EUR per drawing and the Treatment group 0.5 EUR if this phase was chosen for payment. 
 
Investment (Phase II): In Phase 2 acquisition of relevant examples became costly. Only the Treatment group 
was subject to this phase since these subjects, in contrast to the Control group, may have experienced the 
benefits of observing new ideas and thus possessed more information to make informed decisions. The 
experimental procedures had the same structure as Phase 1, but the envelopes were now sold to the subjects 
willing to pay the price. Prices were randomly assigned across participants and privately communicated to 
them, ranging from 0.5 EUR to 3 EUR per example. In case this phase was chosen for payment, the 
participants received 0.5 EUR for each conceptually different drawing minus the total cost of investments 
they made. 
 
Verbal Task 
 
Creative Production (Phase I): Similarly to Graphic Task, in Verbal Task some participants were shown the 
ideas of others, while the others were not. All Verbal Task sessions were computerized10. After reading the 
instructions, the participants saw on their screens a well-known object and were given 10 minutes to type as 
many unusual uses for this object as they could. 
 
Figure 2: Verbal Task, Stage 1 
 
          (a)        (b) 
As in Graphic Task, Phase 1 consisted of two consecutive stages: Stage 1 (6 minutes) and Stage 2 (4 minutes). 
Figure 2(a) shows the Stage 1 user interface. Unusual uses suggested by a subject were numerated and shown 
on the screen together with total number of items and the earnings they would get so far. Figure 2(b) shows 
the Stage 2 user interface. At minute 6, each subject in the Treatment group was randomly matched to 
another participant. All the items suggested by her partner during Stage 1 appeared on the screen. The 
matching was not symmetric, e.g. it is not necessarily the case that two subjects observe the ideas of each 
other. The Control group participants were not shown any new information and just have 4 additional 
minutes to perform the same task. The payment scheme was exactly the same as for Graphic Task: the Control 
group participants received 0.25 EUR for each conceptually different item; The Treatment group participants 
were paid 0.5 EUR for each unique item if this phase was chosen to be paid. It is not possible to ensure in the 
computerized that all the ideas observed by the participants are new to them due to technological 
restrictions. Several people often come up with several similar ideas, particularly at the very beginning of the 
                                                                    
10 The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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phase. Thus, a part of output shown to the subjects sometimes duplicated their own output, in other words, 
not all ideas were new to the subjects. 
 
Investment (Phase II): As in Graphic Task, Phase 2 introduced the costs of obtaining access to ideas. 
However, unlike in Graphic Task, subjects could choose their partner. When participants reached minute 6, 
they were randomly split into groups, each consisting of five people. Each group member had an opportunity 
to buy access to the Stage 1 output of her group members. I use the Heckman Selection Model (Heckman, 
1979) to characterize the partner selection in this experiment. The Heckman two-step procedure allows me 
to correct for selection bias, which can occur since I only observe the partners of subjects who decided to 
form connections. If the decision to form connections is not random, a simple OLS analysis of the partner 
selection would be misleading. 
 
Figure 3: Verbal Task, Phase II 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the Stage 2 user interface. Each subject was shown a table with a menu of possible contacts 
available to her. Each potential contact was characterized by a pseudonym, number of items produced in 
Stage 1 and contact price. To make contacting more creative individuals more expensive, the price was set 
proportional to the partner’s output in Stage 1 (equal to Stage 1 production divided by 10). In these 
experimental sessions prices ranged from 0.5 EUR to 2.6 EUR per connection. The subjects had to select the 
corresponding line and press the button "Contact" to see the output of a group member. The participants 
were free to make one, multiple or no contacts at all. The decision to acquire the output of others could be 
made at any point in time until the end of Phase 2. In the case that the stage was chosen for payment, the 
participants were paid 0.5 EUR for each unique item minus the total cost of investment in contacts they had 
made. 
 
Risk and Self-Assessment: Self-assessment and risk attitudes were elicited from incentivized behavior and 
all socio-demographic characteristics were taken from the questionnaire and are self-reported. In Verbal 
Task, all the participants assessed their own creative ability with respect to the performance of others, in 
order to develop a measure of overconfidence (Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005). Between Stage 1 and Stage 2 of 
Phase 1, individuals were asked to guess how many participants in their session had come up with more 
items than themselves. Quadratic scoring rule was used as an incentive scheme: the participants who have 
guessed correctly received 1.5 EUR, and the less precise the guess was, the less money was paid. Risk 
attitudes were elicited with the help of the Hey and Orme (1994) procedure in 24 rounds11 once the main 
experiment was over. In addition to other experimental earnings, the subjects were paid the outcome of one 
of these 24 rounds selected at random. 
 
4. Creative Productivity 
 
This section outlines the estimation strategy I use to quantify the effect of new ideas on creative productivity, 
using the data form the experiment. I also develop a simple econometric model that allows me to analyze the 
subjects’ investment decisions in ideas of other players. Finally, I also discuss these investment decisions in 
the context of networks, where each connection is represented by a directed link between these two players. 
                                                                    
11  See Appendix for procedures. 
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In order to conclude on the importance of new ideas por creative productivity I compare average outputs 
produced by the subjects in Treatment and Control groups during the last four minutes of each stage. During 
the first six minutes of the task there was no possibility to access the ideas of others, while during the last 
four minutes, the treatment group was shown several new ideas, which might constitute an important input 
for creative production. If a new idea generated by an individual represents a combination of different pieces 
of already available information, only new pieces of information would stimulate generation of new ideas. 
Learning an idea, which is not currently in the individual’s stock, adds a new element to her information set.  
 
New Ideas and Creative Production: This permits creation of new, unavailable before, combinations of 
information, which in turn might convert to new ideas in what follows I call these new, potentially beneficial 
items ’relevant’ ideas for a given individual. Note that relevance here is a relative concept, as the same idea 
may be relevant for one individual and at the same time irrelevant for another. Let N = {1; 2;…; n} be a set of 
creative producers, and i is a member of this set. Let producer i be endowed with creative ability ci  [0; 1). 
This creative ability reflects an average speed of idea generation when i has no access to any inputs. I denote 
as yiS2 the number of creative items i has produced during the last four minutes (stage 2) of a phase. I model 
i’s production during the last four minutes of the task as a linear function of her creative ability ci12. If i 
belongs to the treatment group in addition to own creative ability, her production is also a function of the 
number of relevant items available to her. Let’s denote the number of there relevant ideas by gi. So, to 
estimate the relationship between the number of relevant items observed by i and the number of creative 
items she produces.  
 
I use the following functional specification: 
 
(1) 
 
Where di is a dummy equal to 1 for all i that belong to the Treatment group and equal to 0 for i in the Control 
group, ui  N(0; u) is an error term, 0, 1, 0 and 1 are the parameters to be estimated. Even though true 
creative ability ci is not observed, I can use the number of items produced by i during the first six minutes of 
the task, yiS1, as a reliable proxy. At this stage there is no other factor influencing productivity, meaning that 
the final output must be highly correlated with individual’s creative ability. In the described setting, the 
number of relevant ideas player i observes is the only variable input for the production of ideas. An 
individual’s ability to create ci constitutes an individual-specific production technology. As explained at the 
beginning of this Section, the number of relevant items, gi, is individual-specific. In what follows I explain my 
approach to its assessment.  
 
Graphic Task: The design of the graphic task is such that the examples are taken from the ‘bank of ideas’. It 
makes sure that each participant in the Treatment Group gets two relevant examples. In this case gi is 
exogenously set and does not depend on an individual’s or partner’s creative ability: gi = g = 2 for any i. 
 
Verbal Task: As described in the experimental design, at the beginning of Stage 2 individual i is randomly 
matched to individual j. As the result of this interaction i observes yjS1 items - all j’s output generated during 
the first six minutes of the task (Stage 1). However, it is not necessarily true that all yjS1 items are relevant to i: 
so gi ≤ yjS1. Under random matching and assumption of finite set of all possible ideas, it must be true that the 
number of ideas relevant for i is positively related to the size of j’s set of ideas, while negatively related to the 
size of own idea set. In other words, the probability that a randomly chosen j’s idea is relevant to i increases 
with the number of ideas j has and decreases with the number of ideas i has. To take into account these 
considerations I shall approximate the number of relevant ideas i receives from interaction with j with the 
function increasing in yjS1 and decreasing in yiS1. 
 
(2)  
 
                                                                    
12 I tested for potential non-linear effects and the results indicate that a linear model fits the data better. 
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I choose to use (2) to assess the number of relevant ideas i gets from interaction with j due to its simplicity 
and intuitively13. The identification of (1) is possible due to two-step random assignment: (i) random 
assignment of the participants to the Treatment or Control group and (ii) random matching between 
individuals in the verbal task. As long as the creative abilities of the matching partners are uncorrelated, the 
true causal relationship can be estimated. If I find the estimate     to be positive, I would interpret it as a 
positive effect of observing relevant ideas on own creative productivity. This would mean that there are 
positive benefits of access to ideas of others on aggregate output. I expect the constant treatment effect     to 
be equal to zero if only relevant ideas are useful for creative production. The opposite would mean that a 
constant treatment effect exists and it is independent of the number of relevant ideas the players observe. 
 
Investment Decisions: Once the impact of new ideas on creative productivity is estimated, I can draw an 
inference about the increase in potential productivity that a new idea brings. For any pair of producers i and j, 
it is possible to assess a number of additional items i should expect to produce if she observes j’s items. 
Denote λi the expected number of new ideas i produces when she observes j’s output. The expected value this 
connection brings to i can be assessed as: 
 
 
where      and      are the OLS14 estimates of equation (1) and gij is given by (2). Conceptually, λi represents i’s 
opportunity cost of investment in j’s ideas. If i is a payoff-maximize, λi would represent the maximum price 
she is willing to pay to observe the output of j. Let Pij denote the price i must pay to access the ideas of j. The 
net benefit i receives from connection to j, πij, is given by the difference between expected output increase and 
the price: 
 
Let xi be a binary variable representing i’s investment decision: xi = 1 when i decides to acquire someone’ 
ideas in the second stage and xi = 0 otherwise. An investment is beneficial only when it brings positive net 
profits. I estimate the following equation to infer if on average the investment decisions in the experiment are 
beneficial to the participants (rather than loss-making): 
 
(3) 
Where vi  N(0; v) is an error term, γ0,  γ 1 and  γ 2 are the parameters to be estimated. If participants make 
profit-maximizing investments, the costs and benefits of the connections would have the same weight for the 
investment decisions, and I should observe    = -  . If, instead,    > -  , data would indicate that expected 
benefits, on average, outweigh price effect in the investment decision process, and the producers are willing 
to carry out loss-making investments. Regarding the constant term, I should find    = 0 if investment 
decisions are not systematically influenced by factors other than costs and benefits of connections. Instead, 
for example, if subjects derive some utility from interactions, I may observe our constant term being 
positive15. 
 
Partner Selection: When, as in our verbal task, a producer has more than one investment possibility, the fact 
that an investment is not loss-making does not necessarily imply it is a net-benefit maximizing decision. 
Imagine producer i can choose between two potential connections (partners): producer j (with yjS1 items) and 
producer k (with ykS1 items). According to the experimental design, the price associated to each of these 
connections is proportional to the number of items a partner has: 
 
 
                                                                    
13 (i) The probability of relevance approaches 1 as yjS1 goes to infinity or yiS1 = 0; (ii) it is equal to zero when 
yjS1 = 0 or yiS1 approaches infinity. 
14 Estimating (1) with Tobit gives identical to OLS results. Although theoretically bounded below zero, in 
practice the dependent variable is equal to zero in less than 1% of the cases. 
15 Note that if the constant is zero, the degree of risk aversion should not influence investment decisions. Any 
concave utility function is maximized when expected net benefits from investment are maximized. 
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Where   (0; 1) is an exogenously set positive coefficient if yjS1  ykS1, one of the producers will be expected 
to bring higher net benefits to i. A profit-maximizing producer i would choose to acquire output of j if the 
connection to j results in higher expected profits compared to k: 
 
 
 
Having the estimate     from (1) is sufficient for determining a partner (group member) connection that 
maximizes i’s expected benefits (or minimizes her losses). In what follows I refer to such profit-maximizing 
connection as i’s best partner. As explained earlier in this Section, i should form a connection only if she 
expects to receive positive net benefits from it. Since the best partner brings the highest expected profits, a 
profit-maximizing i will always chose her best partner among other available connections. Participants who 
expect to make losses from connection to their best partner should decide not to invest at all. This leads to the 
selection rule based on the best partner’s profitability: 
 
(4) 
Where giBP and PiBP are the number of relevant items and the connection price for i’s best partner 
correspondingly. When investment occurs (xi = 1) I observe partner’s creative output yjS1 and can assess the 
number of relevant ideas i observes gij. I use the following model to check whether producers indeed chose 
their best partners: 
 
(5) 
Where giBP is the number of relevant ideas i’s best partner has, Xi = (X1; :::; Xn) is a vector of i’s individual 
characteristics, wi  N(0; w) is an error term, 0, 1 and  = (1;…; n) are the parameters to be estimated. 1 
indicates the degree of similarity between best and chosen partner.  = (1;…; n) is a vector of parameters 
that characterize the importance of individual characteristics for the partner choice. If the participants make 
profit-maximizing partner choice I should observe connection to the best partner (   = 1 and    = 0) and no 
effect of individual characteristics on the choice (   = 0). By examining vector  I will be able to highlight 
individual-specific factors that matter for connection choice. Vector Xi is composed by behavioral (risk 
attitude, overconfidence) and demographic characteristics (gender, GPA, etc.) measured in the experiment or 
taken from questionnaire responses. 
 
5. Results 
 
In this section I report the estimation results. First, I report average treatment effects in Phase I and conclude 
on the importance of new ideas for creative productivity. Second, I use these estimations to analyze the 
investment decisions that the participants made in Phase II. The participants were randomly assigned to a 
Treatment or a Control session and, as expected, all observable demographic characteristics are similar 
across treatments: around 50% of the participants are females, the average age is 22.5 years old and the 
average GPA is around 66% in both groups. Average levels of creative ability measured as a total number of 
distinct items produced in Stage 1 are also similar across groups and sessions. There are significant 
differences in creative output between the tasks: participants produced 10.5 items on average in the graphic 
task, while the average production was 9.4 items in verbal task. I control for this difference in our 
estimations. The absence of significant differences ex-ante between Control and Treatment groups should 
imply that any differences in the output produced during the last 4 minutes is due to the unique variable 
attribute of the experimental design, access to the ideas of others. 
 
Phase 1-Creative Production: In both experimental tasks experimental design provides identical conditions 
for the Control and Treatment group participants during the first six minutes of the task. I use creative output 
produced at this stage, yiS1 as a proxy for i’s creative ability. In the second stage (last 4 minutes) there is just 
one difference between the treatments: the Control group participants did not have access ideas of others, 
while the Treatment group participants did. If observing creative output helps to generate more ideas, I 
should find higher levels of output yiS2 in treatment with access to the ideas of others. Figure 4 shows our 
aggregate results graphically for each of the two experimental tasks.  
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Figure 4: Treatment Effects 
On average, Treatment group (TR=1) produced more creative items during the second stage of the task than 
the control group (TR=0). In the Graphic task sessions the participants who observed two relevant drawings 
produced on average 1.07 items more than the Control group participants (one-sided t-test, p-value 0.06). In 
relative terms, this result translates to a 20% increase in creative productivity. Regarding the Verbal sessions, 
a simple comparison between treatments might be misleading. The experimental design of the verbal 
sessions does not ensure a particular number of new items. In this way, being assigned to the Treatment 
group does not necessarily imply access to new ideas. With the aim of a simple comparison, I divide 
Treatment group participants who performed Verbal task into two sub-groups. The first sub-group (TR=1-) 
includes those participants whose randomly selected connection is a subject of lower creative ability than a 
median participant, in other words, the number of ideas that these participants observe is less than the 
median number of items produced in the first stage of the task. The second group (TR=1+) comprises the 
individuals who observed output of upper-50% creative individuals. If the ideas that are not new to a subject 
do not help to generate more creative items, I should expect to find higher production levels for the 
connections to high-creative ability players (as in TR=1+) compared to connections to low-ability players 
(TR=1-) or no connections at all (TR=0). Indeed, as Figure 4 shows, those connected to lower-than-median 
participants did not produce more items than Control group participants. Observing ideas of more creative 
than median participants (TR=1+) resulted on average in 0.78 extra items produced during the last four 
minutes of the creative task (one-sided t-test, p-value 0.07).  
 
This difference implies a 19% increase in creative productivity for those who observed items of subjects with 
upper-tan-median creative ability. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that repetitive ideas are not 
useful. Only those who had access to a greater number of ideas were more likely to observe new ones and as a 
result could produce more of their own output. Although these aggregate results are intuitive and easy to 
interpret, note that the creative output depends not only on the ideas of others, but also on the participants’ 
own creative ability. Controlling for it helps to obtain cleaner and more precise results especially if (as I 
assume in Section 4) the number of extra items produced is a function of the number of new ideas observed. 
More creative individuals are less likely to be connected to someone who could ensure many new ideas and 
their impact could be underestimated in aggregate comparison. I estimate average treatment effects 
controlling for creative ability to take this consideration into account. In what follows I summarize the results 
of our OLS estimation. Table 3 contains the results of OLS estimation of creative production function given by 
(1): 
 
The first column reports the estimation results based on the data from Graphic Task, the second column only 
on data from Verbal Task, and the third column uses pooled data from both tasks. For a pooled estimation, I 
control for potential differences between the tasks by introducing a dummy for Graphic task, GR. 
(6) 
This equation does not contain the intersection term between GR and treatment dummy as it is perfectly 
correlated with gi  GRi  gi, when gi is constant across individuals as was the case. 
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Table 3: Average Treatment Effects 
Dependent Variable - Number of Items Produced During the Last 4 Minutes 
  Graphic Verbal Pooled  
 Creative ability (proxy) 0.446*** 0.378*** 0.378***  
 
Creative ability   task A dummy 
(0.10) (0.049) (0.052)  
   0.678  
    (0.104)  
 Treatment dummy  -1.049 -1.049  
   (0.692) (0.74)  
 Relevant items observed (expected) 0.596** 0.356*** 0.356***  
 
Relevant items   task A dummy 
(0.298) (0.128) (0.137)  
   0.765**  
    (0.376)  
 Constant 1.056 0.613 0.613  
 
Constant   task A dummy 
(1.164) (0.489) (0.523)  
   0.444  
    (1.171)  
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
 
As Table 3 shows, own creative ability is strongly correlated with creative output in Phase 2. On average, an 
additional creative item produced in the first stage translates to an increase in Phase 2 production by 0.378-
0.446 items. The constant term is not statistically significant, which means that if access to the ideas of others 
is absent, Stage 2 production is proportional to Stage 1 output. This supports validity of using Stage 1 output 
as a proxy for creative ability. According to the estimation results, being shown ideas of others has a strong 
positive effect on future creative production in both creative tasks. On average, observing one relevant 
example leads to an increase in creative output of 0.6 items or 10% in case of Graphic Task and by 0.35 items 
or 8.5% for Verbal Task. In aggregate terms, the estimated increase in creative production is 1.1 items (or 
20%) in Graphic Task and 5.1 relevant items (or 43%) in Verbal Task. The latter numbers are calculated for 
average ability individuals. These results provide a strong evidence in favor of the positive effects the ideas of 
others have on creative production and are consistent with the stream of literature that find positive effects 
of group creativity versus individual creativity (Stroebe and Diehl, 1994; Paulus and Yang, 2000; Dugosh et 
al., 2000; Nijstad et al., 2002). Indeed access to ideas of others allows combining the creativity of several 
individuals but does not create inefficiencies of the groups in terms of coordination or free riding. The next 
section investigates whether the individuals demonstrate awareness of these potential benefits by making 
beneficial investment decisions when given the opportunity to acquire access to the output of others. 
 
Phase 2 – Investment 
 
Decision to Invest: This section analyses the investment decisions of the subjects. Following the discussion 
of Section 4, in order to conclude whether an investment decision is beneficial I compare expected benefits 
from investment in acquisition of ideas to the cost of that investment. The benefits are defined as the 
monetary equivalent of the expected increase in creative output due to new ideas (opportunity costs of 
investment) and the costs of an investment are given exogenously. For Verbal sessions, there is more than 
one potential partner and they differ in terms of connection costs as well as in terms of expected new items. 
Although I observe investment decisions, I do not possess the information on the exact decision-making 
process. Note that higher creative ability of a partner implies higher expected benefits, but also higher 
connection costs at the same time. The group member with maximum creative ability is not guaranteed to be 
the best choice of everyone, as there could be another group member, connection to whom is predicted to 
result in higher net benefits. For simplicity of analysis, I analyze investment decision from the point of view of 
’the best partner rule’. The best partner is a connection that brings the highest expected net benefit.  
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A profit-maximizing investor should invest in the connection to her best partner when this expected net 
benefit is positive and not to invest when negative. To calculate ex-ante opportunity costs for each subject, I 
first calculate the expected benefits of all connections available to her using the estimates reported in Table 4. 
Then I compare each expected benefit to the cost of connection specified by the experimental design. In this 
way I identify the best partner for each subject in the sample. The opportunity costs of investment are the 
expected benefits associated to the connection to the best partner, the costs are the costs of connection to her. 
I use (3) to assess to what extend the participants’ actual investment decisions are beneficial: 
 
 
Where xi is equal to 1 when i decides to invest and to 0 otherwise, λji represents the opportunity costs of 
investment (in Graphic task) or connecting to the best partner (in Verbal task), Pij is the investment cost. 
Equality of γ1 and γ2 would be an evidence of balanced, profit-maximizing investment decision. The results 
are presented in Table 4. The first column reports probit estimates of (3) suggesting that higher opportunity 
costs are associated with a higher probability of investing, and higher connection prices are associated with 
lower probability of investment. Only the contact price coefficient is significantly different from zero, but the 
hypothesis regarding the equality the effects and efficiency of investment decisions is not rejected. The 
second column of Table 4 explores to what extend creative ability determines investment decision. If more 
productive individuals choose to acquire more ideas, I should observe a positive relationship between 
creative ability and investment dummy. But as the estimation results suggest, creative ability does have an 
impact neither on the decision to invest nor on the coefficients of opportunity costs and price. This evidence 
is in contrast with the hypothesis that higher productivity leads to more interactions. Neither this evidence 
supports the theoretical prediction on more risky behavior that laggards exhibit in their attempts to catch up 
(Cabral, 2003; Anderson and Cabral, 2007). 
 
Table 4: Marginal Effects for Investment Decisions, Probit 
Dependent Variable - Decision to Invest at Least Once 
   (1)  (2)  
  Probit Regr. Marginal Effects Probit Regr. Marginal Effects  
 Opportunity costs 0.414 0.160 0.451 0.174  
 (estimated) (0.356) (0.137) (0.360) (0.138)  
 Price of contact -0.537** -0.207** -0.549** -0.212**  
  (0.23) (0.087) (0.233) (0.089)  
 Creative ability   0.022 0.008  
    (0.032) (0.012)  
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The next section investigates what 
other factors other than cost-benefit weighting influence investment decisions in our creative environment. 
 
Choice of a Partner: Verbal session design is based on an environment, which allows me to analyze 
investment decisions more deeply. Each single investment decision can be partitioned into two sub-decisions: 
(i) invest or not to invest, and if yes, (ii) whom to choose as a partner. The estimates in Table 4 demonstrate 
that participants’ investment decisions are consistent with the behaviour of a profit-maximizing individual 
and the potential benefits are on average well calibrated. This section analyses the second part of the 
investment decision. As I illustrate in Section 4, a profit-maximizing investor should follow the best partner 
rule. This rule states that if the maximum attainable net benefit is positive, the subject should invest in 
connection to the individual who is associated to this highest benefit. If, in the opposite case, the highest 
attainable net benefit is negative, the subject is better off not investing at all and should not form any 
connections. In what follows, I analyze the relationship between the expected number of relevant items that 
the best and actually chosen partners have. I do not observe partners for the participants who decided not to 
invest at all. To control for the link-forming decision, I use the Heckman two-step procedure, where in the 
first step individuals assess the profitability of investing in a connection to their best partner available, and 
the second step is actual partner choice. The selection equation is given by (4) and the partner choice by (5). 
The first-step estimates (selection equation) are reported in Table 4 and are in line with profit-maximizing 
investment decisions.  
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Table 5 reports the estimates of six different specifications for second step, partner selection. The first 
column of Table 5 shows the basic specification: the dependent variable is the expected number of relevant 
items a subject’ partner has and the independent variable is the expected number of items the subject’ best 
partner has. These estimation results show the absence of any significant relationship between the two. On 
average, the selected partner’s profile does not coincide with the choice that maximizes expected net benefits. 
Choice of the partner is not a simple decision to be made ex-ante. Before the partner’s output is revealed to a 
participant, in other words, before the decision is made, the number of relevant items remains uncertain. This 
in turn introduces uncertainty in future benefits and makes investment decision risky. Thus, investment 
decisions in this environment (as any other decision under risk or uncertainty) might be affected by subjects’ 
risk attitudes or/and other individual characteristics. Columns 2-6 of Table 5 report the estimates of five 
alternative model specifications. In addition to the best partner items, these specifications include various 
individual characteristics that may have an effect on the partner’s profile. These characteristics include risk 
attitudes, creative ability, self-assessment of own creative ability, gender, age, GPA and other demographic 
variables. These connections can be interpreted as unproductive: they are unlikely to bring new ideas but are 
still costly to participants as Figure 4 shows. 
 
Table 5: Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
Dependent Variable - Expected Number of Relevant Items 
Opportunity osts 0.521 1.081*** 1.071*** 1.134*** 1.127*** 1.165*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) 
Price of connection -0.528** -0.754** -0.766** -0.760** -0.759** -0.749** 
 (0.21) (0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
New items (best partner) 0.104 -0.096 -0.12 -0.059 -0.023 -0.137 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) 
Risk parameter  4.917* 5.134** 7.019*** 7.308*** 8.993*** 
  (2.53) (2.44) (2.29) (2.18) (2.43) 
Perceived ranking   -5.949* -6.063* -5.382* -7.723** 
   (3.45) (3.15) (3.02) (3.67) 
Creative ability    0.468** 0.526*** 0.568*** 
    (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Female     -1.828* -2.409** 
     (1.05) (1.11) 
GPA      0.127 
      (0.09) 
2D:4D ratio      -16.69 
      (20.31) 
Left-handed      -1.70 
      (1.95) 
CRT      0.356 
      (0.91) 
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
 
The choice of partner is to a great extend explained by an individual’s risk attitudes16, gender, creative ability 
and confidence in own creative ability17. More risk-neutral subjects usually aim for more creative partners 
and a 0.1 change in risk parameter toward risk-neutrality imply from 5 to 9 more expected new items 
                                                                    
16 See Appendix for elicitation and estimation. Risk parameter is equal to 1 for risk-neutral individuals and 0 
for completely risk-averse. 
17 Self reported percentile according to creative ability. 
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depending on specification. The individuals with higher creative ability also opt for connections with a higher 
expected number of new items and an additional point of creativity is associated with approximately 0.5 
additional new items. The subjects with higher self-assessed position in creative ranking, in contrast, aim for 
less creative partners, where a 10% increase in self-perceived ranking lowers the expected number of related 
items by 0.6-0.8. Furthermore, females chose lower quality partners; their partners are expected to ensure 
1.8-2.4 new items less than those chosen by males. However, this result is just marginally significant. 
Although controlling for other variables such as being left-handed, 2D:4D ratio or GPA and the results of 
cognitive reflection test adds explicative power to the estimation, these variables do not have a significant 
effect on the partner chosen. The overconfidence effect could be explained by a desire for superiority, creative 
ability effect, as possible higher self-awareness due to a deeper experience and risk aversion effect as a desire 
to avoid higher costs. However, these are only possibilities, as I am not aware of any theory that would 
embrace all these findings. In his study the participants in competitive treatments (with riskier rewards) 
produced better creative output (minimizing the risks of not being rewarded). The results of this paper also 
indicate that more risk a-verse participants act in risk minimizing way by selecting partners that maximize 
the expected number of new items.  
 
Networks: This section considers the investment behaviour in the context of networks. Figure 5 depicts all 
the networks formed in the Verbal sessions of the experiment (solid lines). Each node represents an 
individual, the number next to the node corresponds to their creative ability (e.g. the number of items 
generated during the first 6 minutes of the creative task) and each arrow between two nodes corresponds to 
the connections formed by an initiating node to the node of destination. Each network consists of five nodes 
located in descending order of creative ability from top to the bottom: the node corresponding to the 
maximum creative ability in a given group is always shown on the top, and the minimum at the bottom. In 
total, 31 links were formed in 4 sessions. 28 out of 60 participants have decided to form connections: 3 
individuals have formed two links, and the remaining 25 one link each. From the other side, 23 individuals 
were contacted in total, among them 16 were contacted once, 6 were contacted twice and one participant was 
contacted three times. The findings on importance of attitudes towards risk for investment behavior are in 
line with the literature on choices under uncertainty, which were not studied much in the context of 
creativity. Also, these results are in line with conclusions of Gross (2018) on risk minimization in creative 
contexts. Following the discussion in Section 4, all profit-maximizing links should connect a subject with her 
best partner. Optimal connections were derived as the connections that give maximum nonnegative expected 
profit to the participants.  
 
If neither of the available partners gives positive profits, no connections should be formed, and if several of 
them are expected to bring positive profit, the one corresponding to maximum profit should be optimally 
chosen. Figure 5 depicts the best partner connections with dashed lines. If there are no dashed lines in the 
graph, no links should be formed. Only one link was made according to the best partner rule (Session 3, from 
10 to 18) and a further 30 should not have been formed according to the optimal decision rule. Moreover, 
although for the majority of participants their predicted best partners are of higher than own creative ability 
only 11 out of 31 links were made to the people of higher creative ability. The participants of maximum 
creative ability in the group would be an exception, as the only choice available to them is to connect to 
someone with a lower creative ability than their own. A total of 8 out of 20 links to nodes of lower-than-own 
creative ability were formed by maximum ability individuals. However, neither of these links was made to a 
second-best node, but to substantially lower nodes instead. As the Figure 5 shows, actual connection 
behaviour in the experiment is at odds with the profit-maximizing strategy. As a rule, the links formed to 
lower than optimal creative ability individuals result in losses in actual or potential profits from forming 
links. The explanation to this phenomenon is that, as discussed earlier, the connection behaviour is 
determined by risk attitudes, own creative ability and other individual characteristics, and does not reflect 
the best possible connection that could have been made in a given network.                                                            
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Figure 5: Real and Profit-Maximizing Networks 
Session 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Connections Formed, Distributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Own - partner’s creative ability  (b) Group’s median - partner’s creative ability 
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Figure 6 characterizes the links formed in the experiment. Figure 6 (a) shows the distribution of differences 
between own creative ability and the creative ability of the chosen partner. Figure 6 (b) shows the 
distribution of differences between median creative ability in the participant’s group and the partners’ 
creative ability. More than 70% of all connections are formed to a participant of lower than own creative 
ability and more than 85% of the links were formed to a subject of lower than observed median creative 
ability. Only 2 out of 12 networks formed are optimal and are estimated to have positive net benefits18. Two 
thirds of the networks would lead to net losses according to the estimations presented in Table 3. Defined as 
a sum of all participants’ payoffs (Bala and Goyal, 2000), the efficiency of a network with heterogeneous 
agents is determined by its structure (Galeotti et al., 2006). Previous experiments conducted to deal with 
equilibrium network structure and the process of network formation (see for example Callander and Plott, 
2005; Berninghaus et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Corbae and Duffy, 2008; Goeree et al., 2009), impose the 
agents’ heterogeneity in costs of forming a link. In this spirit, this paper also deals with structure and 
efficiency of a network with heterogeneous agents. However, in this real-effort creative environment the 
costs are determined endogenously and payoffs depend on own effort, ability, investment decisions and 
uncertain quality of the connections. In line with previous research, the experimental results suggest that 
whilst some connections are beneficial, the resulting networks are inefficient. 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The experiment described in this paper relies on a simple creative environment that somehow reflects a flow 
of information between creative professionals. It excludes, however, any communication channel distinct 
from observing ideas of others. Such synthetic experimental environment does not incorporate opportunities 
for discussion or feedback, which may be beneficial, in addition to the inspiration derived from observation of 
output of others. Thus, these experimental results can be considered as a lower bound of potential benefits 
from creative communication. The first finding of this study is that getting to know ideas of others increases 
creative productivity of an individual. This implies that availability of information on what others are doing is 
beneficial for total creative output. The second finding suggests that when this information is costly, the 
individuals do not extract much use of it. They prefer, in general, save the cost of getting access to this 
information, by not getting it at all or choose to get it from a cheaper but not so valuable source. These 
investment decisions in ideas of others are not profit-maximizing in expected terms, and moreover are 
subject to many behavioral biases, such as overconfidence in own creative ability or attitudes towards risk. As 
the result, the networks formed by the individuals to exchange creative output are not efficient and deliver 
less than optimal creative output, on aggregate.  
 
While the first finding is accepted and internalized by firms and organizations, that usually implement 
policies and practices that facilitate access of ideas for creative professionals (e.g. workshops, regular catch-
ups, online interactions, libraries and other informational resources), the second finding does not seem to be 
widely recognized despite of some evidence on inefficiencies in R&D spending (Conte et al., 2009). Learning 
about what others are doing is almost never for free. Even if the monetary cost associated to this is zero, there 
is always an opportunity cost of time dedicated to this activity, which is, in case of creative professionals, 
their most valuable resource. Knowing that individuals prefer not to acquire costly but valuable information 
and do not invest optimally in getting to know what other do, suggests two complementary policy lines. The 
first would concentrate on making information acquisition less costly for the professionals. Examples of such 
policy include minimizing individual´s perception of the cost, ideally by directing money flows to more risk 
neutral organisms rather than individuals (by handling professional subscription decisions on an 
organization level rather that, letting the professionals decide which of them need to be acquired, 
reconsidering grant system in academia, by handling it on a department level, rather than on the level of a 
research group), as well as the effort in actual cost reduction through efficiency improvement of information 
handling. The second would establish requirements or recommendations for activities dedicated to learning 
about output of others.  
 
                                                                    
18 Net benefits for a network are calculated as a total predicted additional output due to connections minus 
total cost of these connections. 
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Examples of this include central planning of the collaborative activities between departments or even 
organizations, recommendations to dedicate at least 30 minutes a day to browsing a specific online 
community or studying a specific web resource. Corporate world seems to have incorporated the last action 
already in their day-to-day activities, for example many consulting firms distribute tailor-made newsletters 
every morning to their consultants, meaning to serve as information and inspiration source. For the outcomes 
to be positive, and lead to an increase in aggregate creative output of an organization, all these measures 
should be carefully evaluated against potential costs and negative impacts they may have in other 
dimensions. The field of experimental studies on creativity is still developing and many areas remain yet 
unexplored. Although this study provides evidence on benefits of getting access to ideas of others, it has many 
limitations, as the experiment was made in one particular creative environment and for one particular 
creative task. The conclusions, as well as their broader implications, may be not the same for other types of 
creativity, or reach saturation levels when individuals reach a certain level of information on what others are 
doing. Another area of future research is the nature of the behavioral effects I observe at an investment stage, 
as understanding why risk aversion or perceived position matters for connecting behavior would be 
important for designing policies that overcome these inefficiencies. 
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Appendix 
 
Instructions: Graphic Task: The purpose of this experiment is to study the behavior on decision-making. Do 
not think that any particular behavior is expected from you. However, be aware that your decisions will affect 
the money you can earn during the experiment. These instructions will explain you the rules of the 
experiment. Instructions are identical for all participants. The anonymity of the participants and their 
decisions is also guaranteed. Please, it is important that you do not talk to nor disturb other participants. If 
you need help, raise your hand and wait in silence. Someone will come to you as soon as possible. This 
experiment consists of two Stages (and each stage consists of 3 phases). Your total earnings in the experiment 
will be determined at the end of it, as a sum of three phases of a randomly chosen stage. 
 
Stage 1 
 
Phase 1: All the tasks of this phase have to be done with BLUE color pen, which you already have on your 
table. Phase 1 begins once we finish reading instructions and will last 6 minutes. In this phase you will get a 
sheet of paper containing cells with geometric forms, which you would need to complete to get a drawing of a 
concrete object (precise, definite). Each drawing has to stay inside of a cell. A drawing can be very schematic, 
the quality of the drawing doesn’t have any importance, but it has to be clear which object are you referring 
to. You are free to rotate the form and skip some cells 
 
Figure 1                                             Figure 2                                                           Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your earnings in this phase will be determined as follows. For each unique drawing you will receive 50 cents. 
So, to earn more money, you task is to make as much different drawings as possible. Figure 1 contains an 
example of the sheet you will receive. In this example each drawing should contain just one of the inverses Ts. 
Figure 2 shows two examples of drawings with this form. Given that both use inverse T as a base for the glass, 
these two drawings cannot be considered as conceptually different. In this case the participant will receive 
just 50 cents as for one drawing. Figure 3 gives an example of a drawing using two geometric forms. This 
drawing intersects the boundary of the cell, which is prohibited by the rules. In this case the participant will 
receive 0 cents for the drawing of a boat. Summarizing, the total amount of money you can get in this phase 
depends on the number of conceptually unique drawings that you do. 
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Phase 2: All the tasks of this phase have to be done with BLACK color pen, which you already have on your 
table. Phase 2 starts after reading the instructions and will last 2 minutes. In this phase we will give you an 
example of a drawing which you haven’t done in the previous phase and which incorporates given geometric 
form. This example is just for you, it is important not to show it to any other participant and not to try to see 
the examples of others. To assure that you receive a NEW example, please, if the envelope contains the 
drawing that you already have, raise your hand and we will give you another drawing. After receiving an 
example, your task is to continue drawing as much drawings as you can, that contain given geometric form. 
Use the same sheet of paper we gave you at the beginning of the experiment. The requirements are the same 
as in the previous phase: each drawing has to be inside of a cell, can be very schematic, the quality doesn’t 
matter, but has to be understandable which object you are referring to. It’s OK to skip some cells. It’s not OK 
to draw the same example we gave you. Your earnings in this phase have the same structure as the previous 
one: for each unique drawing you can receive 50 cents. So, the total earnings in this phase depend just on the 
number of unique drawings you produce in these 2 minutes. 
 
Stage 2 
 
Phase 2 (see Stage 1 for Phase 1): All the tasks of this phase have to be done with BLACK color pen, which 
you already have on your table. Phase 2 starts after reading the instructions and will last 2 minutes. In this 
phase you can BUY an example of a drawing which you haven’t done in the previous phase and which uses 
given geometric form. The price is ___ EUR. This example would be just for you, it is important not to show it 
to any other participant and not to try to see the examples of others. To assure that you receive a NEW 
example, please, if the envelope contains the drawing that you already did, raise your hand and we will give 
you another drawing. After receiving the example, your task is to continue drawing as much drawings as you 
can, that contain given geometric form. Use the same sheet of paper we gave you at the beginning of the 
experiment. The requirements are the same as in the previous phase: each drawing has to be inside of a cell, 
can be very schematic, the quality doesn’t matter, but has to be understandable which object you are 
referring to. It’s OK to skip some cells. It’s not OK to draw the same example we gave you.  
 
Figure 7: Examples Suggested to the Participants19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions: Verbal Task: The purpose of this experiment is to study the behavior on decision-making. Do 
not think that any particular behavior is expected from you. However, be aware that your decisions will affect 
the money you can earn during the experiment. These instructions will explain you the rules of the 
experiment. Instructions are identical for all participants. The anonymity of the participants and their 
decisions is also guaranteed. Please, it is important that you do not talk to nor disturb other participants. If 
you need help, raise your hand and wait in silence. Someone will come to you as soon as possible. This 
experiment consists of two Stages. Your total earnings in the experiment will be determined at the end of it, 
as a sum of three phases of a randomly chosen stage. Your earnings in this phase have the following structure: 
for each unique drawing you can receive 50 cents minus the total investments cost (if occurred). So, the total 
                                                                    
19 Not part of instructions. The examples were suggested in the presented order for each geometric form. In 
case the individual already had the example proposed, the next by order was suggested and so on. Never 
more than one change was needed, one change was needed in 4 cases. 
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earnings in this phase depend on the number of unique drawings you produce in these 2 minutes AND your 
investment decision. 
 
Stage 1: At the beginning of this Stage you will be shown a well-known and widely used object. Your task will 
be to find various ways to use this object different from the usual one. For example, the usual use of a book is 
to read it and one possible unusual use would be to use it as a carpet for computer mouse. This phase will last 
10 minutes and for each conceptually different unusual use you will receive 50 cents. It is very important not 
to introduce similar uses, because for each similar use you suggest we will substract 50 cents from your 
earnings. For example, if you have said that a book can be used to keep the door open, you will receive 50 
cents for this idea, but if you add ’to keep the window open’, 50 cents will be substracted from your earnings 
and in total you would receive zero for these two uses because they are not conceptually different. To 
summarize, to earn more money your task is to produce as many different unusual uses as possible. How to 
use the computer in this task: To let us know the uses you come up with, you will use the computer. To 
introduce a use you need to type it in the bottom part of the screen - as it is shown on the picture below - and 
then press ’ENTER’ button. Please, enter each new use in a new line. In this way, the will be numerated 
automatically. In the left top corner of the screen you will see the statistics on the total numbers of uses you 
have already suggested and your earnings so far. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Important: in case you make entries with no sense, irrelevant or just enter empty lines, the computer will not 
recognize the error immediately and will increase your earnings. However, this will be checked upon 
termination of the experiment, and if such a behavior is detected, all the earnings in a corresponding phase 
will be cancelled. After first 6 minutes of the task you will have a little break, and after it you will continue 
with the same task, the same object and the same rules. The screen will show you all ideas that a random 
person in this room came up with. Observing the ideas of others can help you to generate more your own 
ideas, however, you should not copy the ideas of others or introduces similar, because in this case it will not 
be a different use anymore and 50 cents will be substracted from your earnings. 
 
Stage 2: At the beginning of this Stage you will be shown ANOTHER well-known and widely used object. As in 
the previous stage, your task will be to find various ways to use this object distinct from the usual one. As in 
the previous stage you should enter your ideas in the bottom part of the screen. The stage will last 10 minutes 
and for each conceptually different unusual use you will be paid 50 cents. As in the previous stage, after first 6 
minutes you will have a little break and after it you will need to continue with the same task, the same object 
and the same rules. This time, you and 4 other people in this room chosen randomly will form a group, which 
composition will remain constant until the end of the session. In addition to your statistics you will see a table 
containing the number of ideas each member of your group has, like this: 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To each one of you the ’contact price’ will be assigned, which is proportional to the total number of unusual 
uses the member suggested. The greater is the output - the more expensive will be to contact a particular 
member. You will also see these prices in the statistics table. When you want, you can see the unusual uses 
suggested by a member of your group paying the price of contact to do so, please, select corresponding line 
and press the button ’CONTACT’. The screen will show you all the ideas of the selected person in the middle. 
You can choose to contact one person only, multiple persons or not to make contacts at all. Total amount of 
money spent making contacts by you will be shown in the table of your statistics. To be able to contact 
someone, you have to have sufficient earnings, in case you don’t - the error message will appear. Important: in 
case you make entries with no sense, irrelevant or just enter empty lines, the computer will not recognize the 
error immediately and will increase your earnings. However, this will be checked upon termination of the 
experiment, and if such a behavior is detected, all the earnings in a corresponding phase will be cancelled. 
 
Risk-Elicitation 
 
Instructions: In each of the 24 rounds of this phase, we present you two lotteries and you will have to choose 
the one you prefer. At the end of the experiment the server will determine randomly one out of the 24 rounds, 
and you will be paid the money that results from playing the lottery you selected. In each round, there will 
appear two lotteries on your screen. You will have to choose one. Each lottery assigns different probabilities 
to win four prizes of 0, 5, 10 and 15 euros, respectively. Each prize is associated with one color. This 
association between prizes and colors will hold for all 24 rounds in this phase. The figure below shows an 
example of a lottery. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you choose the lottery on the LEFT, you can earn 0 euros with a probability of 37.5% or 5 euros with a 
probability of 62.5%. If, on the contrary, you choose the lottery on the RIGHT, you can earn 0 with a 
probability of 50%, 5 euros with a probability of 25% and 10 euros with a probability of 25%. In each round, 
you simply have to choose the lottery you prefer by clicking on the corresponding button. It is important that 
you play all 24 lotteries as if it was the one determining your payoff. This is due to the fact that after the 
experiment the server will choose one out of the 24 rounds, and will play the lottery chosen by you in that 
round. In summary, the money you earn depends on the round chosen randomly by the server and the result 
of the lottery chosen by you in that round. 
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Estimation: The risk aversion parameter is estimated for each individual separately by Maximum Likelihood 
estimation procedure. For this purpose, an Expected Utility specification is used: 
 
 
 
qm and wm are the probabilities and prizes in each lottery. 
 
Denote the utility function 
 
Based on latent preferences and choosing a logistic CDF, the conditional log-Likelihood Function is: 
 
 
The estimated ρ parameters vary substantially across individuals. The average estimate is 0.64 and the 
standard deviation is 0.33. 
 
Self-Assessment 
 
Instructions: In Verbal task all the participants assessed their own creative ability with respect to 
performance of others. Between stage 1 and stage 2 of phase I, the individuals were given feedback on their 
output and were asked to guess how many participants in their session have come up with more items than 
themselves. Figure 4 shows a screenshot of this task.  
 
Figure 4: Overconfidence Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quadratic scoring rule was used as an incentive scheme: the participants who have guesses correctly received 
1.5 euros, and the less precise was the guess, the less money was paid. 
 
Estimation: The self-confidence parameter used in estimations is calculated as the self-identified position 
normalized over number the participants in a session. For example, if a subject said that there are 4 
participants with more items than herself, her self-confidence parameter would be 20 (her ranking in 
ascending order) over 24 (total number of participants in the session, resulting in 0.83. 
